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CONSTRUCTING PERMUTATION RATIONAL FUNCTIONS FROM
ISOGENIES
GAETAN BISSON∗ AND MEHDI TIBOUCHI†
Abstract. A permutation rational function f ∈ Fq(x) is a rational function that induces a bijection
on Fq, that is, for all y ∈ Fq there exists exactly one x ∈ Fq such that f(x) = y. Permutation rational
functions are intimately related to exceptional rational functions, and more generally exceptional covers of
the projective line, of which they form the first important example.
In this paper, we show how to efficiently generate many permutation rational functions over large finite
fields using isogenies of elliptic curves, and discuss some cryptographic applications. Our algorithm is based
on Fried’s modular interpretation of certain dihedral exceptional covers of the projective line (Cont. Math.,
1994).
Key words. Permutation rational functions, Exceptional covers, Isogenies, Elliptic curves, Cryptogra-
phy.
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1. Introduction. A map X → Y of (smooth, projective) algebraic curves over a finite
field Fq is called an exceptional cover when the induced map on Fqt -points X(Fqt)→ Y (Fqt)
is a bijection for infinitely many values of t (necessarily including t = 1). The construction
of exceptional covers is an important problem in arithmetic algebraic geometry [8], which
also has applications to cryptography.
One can in particular mention the construction of hash functions with values in algebraic
curves and their Jacobians: while there already is abundant literature on the subject, the
construction techniques proposed so far have been somewhat ad hoc and unsystematic [16],
and only partial results have been obtained for curves of genus ≥ 2 [12, 5, 4]. A more
programmatic approach has been suggested in [17] based on the observation that, given
an exceptional cover X → P1 of the projective line over Fq, one can obtain encodings of
elements of Fq to all curves Y with a non-constant map h : X → Y simply by composing
the bijection P1(Fq) → X(Fq) with h. The construction of hash functions is thus reduced
to obtaining explicit exceptional covers of the projective line.
The simplest such exceptional covers are those of genus zero, namely rational functions
f ∈ Fq(x) inducing a permutation of P
1(Fqt) for infinitely many t. They are not directly
applicable to hashing (since any curve Y with a non-constant map P1 → Y is rational), but
they are comparably well-understood [7, 9] and an interesting first step towards the general
case. Fried [8, §4] also suggested that these exceptional covers should play an important role
in public-key cryptography.
Indeed, exceptional covers are essentially the same objects as permutation rational func-
tions, i.e. rational functions over Fq inducing a bijection of Fq to itself: clearly, an exceptional
cover f : P1 → P1 satisfying f(∞) = ∞ (which can always be satisfied up to a linear frac-
tional transformation) is a permutation rational function, and one can show that if the
degree of f is small compared to q, the converse also holds [10, 18]. In particular, we can
see these rational functions as generalizations of the RSA polynomials xe with e coprime to
q − 1.
Our contributions.. Based on Fried’s modular interpretation of a large class of excep-
tional covers P1 → P1 called exceptional involution covers [7, Cor. 3.5], we describe an
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algorithm to generate permutation rational functions of any constant prime degree ℓ ≥ 5
(which are, in fact, exceptional covers) over large finite fields and show that it is efficient
and practical. We also expand upon the RSA analogy alluded to in [8] and discuss how our
algorithm might indeed be used to obtain new factoring-related trapdoor permutations that
behave better than the RSA trapdoor permutation against certain classes of attacks.
2. Permutation rational functions from isogenies. Consider two elliptic curves
E : y2 = x3 + ax + b and E′ : y2 = x3 + a′x + b′ over a finite field Fq of characteristic
6= 2, 3 and an isogeny ϕ : E → E′ defined over Fq. Since ϕ commutes to the involution
of multiplication by −1, the x-coordinate (resp. y-coordinate) of ϕ(x, y) is an even (resp.
odd) function of y. And since y2 = x3 + ax+ b, this means that there exist unique rational
functions uϕ, vϕ ∈ Fq(x) such that ϕ has the form:
ϕ(x, y) =
(
uϕ(x), y · vϕ(x)
)
.
This paper is based on the following observation.
Theorem 1. Let ϕ : E → E′ as above be an isogeny defined over Fq of prime degree ℓ.
The following conditions are equivalent.
(i) uϕ has no Fq-rational pole;
(ii) the kernel K of ϕ satisfies K(Fq2) = {0};
(iii) uϕ is a permutation rational function.
Proof. (i)⇒ (ii). Let P = (x, y) be a non-identity element of K(Fq2). We know that x
is a pole of uϕ (as P ∈ K) and will now show that x ∈ Fq. First note that P is a generator
of K since that group has prime order ℓ. As a result, in view of the fact that ϕ commutes
with the Frobenius, P must be an eigenvector of the Frobenius F of E for some eigenvalue
λ (when we view F as a linear endomorphism of the Fℓ-vector space E[ℓ](Fq)). Moreover,
since P is in E(Fq2), we have F
2(P ) = P , hence λ = ±1. Therefore, F (P ) = (x,±y) and in
particular xq = x, that is, x ∈ Fq. Thus, x is an Fq-rational pole of uϕ.
(ii)⇒ (iii). The rational fraction uϕ is a permutation rational function if and only if it
has no rational pole and is injective. AssumingK(Fq2) = {0}, uϕ cannot have a rational pole:
indeed, if x were such a pole, a point P on E with that x-coordinate would be defined over
Fq2 and satisfy ϕ(P ) = 0. Suppose now that there exist x, x
′ ∈ Fq such that uϕ(x) = uϕ(x
′).
Take two points P, P ′ ∈ E(Fq2 ) having these values as their respective x-coordinates. Since
uϕ(x) = uϕ(x
′), we have ϕ(P ) = ±ϕ(P ′), and so P ∓P ′ ∈ K(Fq2) = {0}. This implies that
P = ±P ′ and thus x = x′. Therefore uϕ is injective.
(iii)⇒ (i) is clear.
We note that the condition in the theorem can only be satisfied for ℓ ≥ 5. Indeed, since
the kernel of ϕ consists of ℓ points including the point at infinity, the denominator of uϕ
is of degree ℓ − 1. In particular, for ℓ = 2, it is linear and thus does have a rational root.
Moreover, for ℓ odd, the non-zero kernel points come in pairs {±P} of distinct points with
the same x-coordinate, so the denominator of uϕ is actually the square of a polynomial of
degree (ℓ − 1)/2. This again implies that uϕ has a rational pole for ℓ = 3. On the other
hand, we will be able to construct examples of the situation in the theorem for any ℓ ≥ 5.
Note also that under the conditions of the theorem, uϕ is in fact an exceptional cover
P
1 → P1. This follows from the fact that K(Fq2t) remains trivial for any t coprime to the
degree of the finite extension of Fq over which the points of K are defined.
The above theorem enables us to efficiently construct permutation rational functions of
given prime degree ℓ ≥ 5 over prescribed finite fields Fq of cryptographic size. To do so, we
proceed as follows.
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3. Computing isogeny kernels. As before, let E be an elliptic curve defined over a
finite field Fq. Denote by P a point of prime order ℓ and by K the subgroup it generates.
The isogeny E → E/K satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 if and only if K is rational and
K(Fq2) = {0}. The second condition is easy to test: since ℓ is prime, all nontrivial points of
K generate all others; it thus suffices to verify that P is not defined over Fq2 . To efficiently
test whether K is rational we use the following criterion.
Lemma 2. Let P be a point of prime order ℓ on E. Denote by d the degree of the field
extension Fq(xP )/Fq. Let τ be an integer of order exactly d in F
×
ℓ /{±1}. The subgroup K
generated by P is rational if and only x[τ ]P is a Galois conjugate of xP .
Proof. The subgroup K is stable under the involution of multiplication by −1 and is
thus completely determined by the set H of x-coordinates of its nontrivial points, which
forms a principal homogeneous space for F×ℓ /{±1} where λ ∈ F
×
ℓ acts by xP 7→ x[λ]P .
The Frobenius automorphism π of Fqd/Fq stabilizes H and thus acts as an element λπ .
Now let e denotes the degree of the smallest extension of Fq over which H is defined. Note
that Fqe is also the field of definition of K since this subgroup has odd order. Then λπ is
of order exactly d/e. Therefore, the group Gal(Fqd/Fq) embeds in F
×
ℓ /{±1} as µd/e and its
action partitions H into orbits of length d/e. The stabilizer of P ’s orbit is then µd/e. In
particular, e = 1 if and only if x[τ ]P lies in the same orbit as xP .
To make the above criterion explicit, recall that multiplication-by-k is an algebraic map
on E
P = (x, y) 7−→ [k]P =
(
φk(x)
ψk(x)2
,
ωk(x, y)
ψk(x)3
)
where the polynomials φk, ψk, and ωk are efficiently computable. It follows that x-coordinates
of ℓ-torsion points are roots of the so-called ℓ-division polynomial ψℓ(x). If f(x) is a degree-d
irreducible factor of ψℓ(x), we can test whether its roots are the x-coordinates of points P
such that f(x[τ ]P ) = 0 by checking whether
f
(
φτ (x)
ψτ (x)2
)
= 0 mod f(x).
In that case, the x-coordinates of other points ofK are obtained through the map xP 7→ x[ρ]P
for ρ in F×ℓ /{±1}/µd. We can compute them as the roots of
gcd (ψℓ(x), gρ(x)) where gρ(x) = resy
(
f(y), φρ(x) − ψρ(x)
2y
)
.
Indeed, for each P ∈ K there are ρ2 points Q such that [ρ]Q = P , only one of which lies in
K; the others have order ℓρ and are eliminated by taking the gcd with ψℓ(x).
Note that the above is unnecessary for d = ℓ−12 . In that case, the condition of the
lemma always holds and degree-d irreducible factors of ψℓ(x) are directly kernel polynomials
of rational degree-ℓ isogenies.
Putting the above together we obtain Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 has a probabilistic running time of O˜(ℓ4+ǫ log(q)2).
Proof. Step 1 computes the division polynomial ψℓ(x) ∈ Fq[x] which is of degree
ℓ2−1
2 .
Using the formulas of [19, page 200] and an asymptotically fast method for polynomial
multiplication, this takes quasi linear time in the output: O(ℓ2 log(q)).
The loop from Step 4 runs a maximum of O(ℓǫ) iterations, for any ǫ > 0, thanks to the
bound on the number of divisors from [1, Theorem 13.12].
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Algorithm 1 Compute kernel polynomials satisfying Theorem 1.
Input: an elliptic curve E/Fq with q = p
α, p 6= 2, 3, and a prime ℓ /∈ {2, 3, p}.
Output: the list L of all kernel polynomials of ℓ-isogenies satisfying the conditions of
Theorem 1.
1: compute the ℓ-division polynomial ψℓ(x) of E/Fq.
2: let ω denote a generator of F×ℓ .
3: initialize L to the empty list.
4: for each positive divisor d of ℓ−12 other than 1 do
5: compute the set F of degree-d irreducible factors of ψℓ(x).
6: let τ be the smallest positive integer such that τ ≡ ±ω
ℓ−1
2d mod ℓ.
7: using a remainder tree, compute af = φτ (x)/ψτ (x)
2 mod f(x) for each f ∈ F .
8: while F is not empty do
9: remove the first element from F and call it f .
10: if f(af ) 6= 0 mod f(x) then
11: continue to the next iteration.
12: end if
13: let k ← f .
14: for m = 1 to ℓ−12d − 1 do
15: let ρ be the smallest positive integer such that ρ ≡ ±ωm mod ℓ.
16: let g(x)← resy
(
f(y), φρ(x)− ψρ(x)
2y
)
.
17: let g(x)← monic (gcd(ψℓ(x), g(x))).
18: let k ← g · k.
19: remove g(x) from F .
20: end for
21: add k(x) to the list L .
22: end while
23: end for
24: return L .
In order to find the irreducible factors of degree d < ℓ−12 of ψℓ(x) we use ideas from the
Cantor–Zassenhaus algorithm: first we evaluate
r(x) =
gcd
(
ψℓ(x), x
qd − x
)
gcd
(
ψℓ(x), xq − x
)
which is the product of all such factors; then we isolate those factors by iteratively splitting
r(x) as
r(x) = g(x) ·
r(x)
g(x)
where g(x) = gcd
(
r(x), h(x)
qd−1
2
)
with h(x) drawn uniformly at random from Fq[x]/(r(x)). Evaluating such expressions boils
down to computing O(qℓ)-powers in Fq[x]/(r(x)) which, since r(x) has degree O(ℓ
2), gives
an asymptotic complexity of O˜(ℓ3 log(q)2) for Step 5.
Step 7 takes at most ℓ2+ǫ elementary operations in Fq using [14].
Both Step 16 and 17 use O(dℓ2) operations over Fq. They run at most once per element
f ∈ F , which gives an overall contribution of O˜(ℓ4 log(q)) to the running time. This
dominates the loop from Step 8 to 22.
4. Computing permutation rational functions. We now turn to our main algo-
rithm. First recall that isomorphism classes of elliptic curves can be uniquely identified by
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Algorithm 2 Compute permutation rational functions.
Input: a prime power q = pα with p 6= 2, 3 and a prime ℓ /∈ {2, 3, p}.
Output: permutation rational functions of degree ℓ over Fq.
1: compute the reduction to Fq[X ] of the ℓ-modular polynomial Φℓ(X,Y ).
2: loop
3: repeat
4: draw an element j ∈ Fq uniformly at random.
5: until the polynomial Φℓ(X, j) has at least one root.
6: let E/Fq denote an elliptic curve with j-invariant j.
7: for each polynomial f(x) output by Algorithm 1 do
8: compute the isogeny ϕ with kernel polynomial f(x) using Kohel’s formula.
9: return its x-coordinate map uϕ.
10: end for
11: end loop
their j-invariant. Under this map, pairs of ℓ-isogenous elliptic curves (E,E′) are completely
characterized by the equality Φℓ(j(E), j(E
′)) = 0 where Φℓ(X,Y ) denotes the ℓ-modular
polynomial. Thus, to select a rational ℓ-isogeny E → E′, we simply draw j(E) uniformly at
random from Fq until Φℓ(X, j(E)) has a root.
For all suitable kernel polynomials f(x) found by Algorithm 1, we output the correspond-
ing isogeny map derived using Kohel’s formula [13, Section 2.4]. This gives Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4. Heuristically, Algorithm 2 runs in O˜(ℓ4+ǫ log(q)2) time.
Proof. Step 1 uses the method of [3] to compute the modular polynomial in O˜(ℓ3 log(q))
operations. For Step 7 we refer to Algorithm 1. Finally, the complexity of Step 8 is quasi
linear in its input.
To conclude the proof, we only need to show that the average number of loop iterations
is bounded. First consider the innermost loop. The probability that a random j-invariant
satisfies the condition in Step 5 is exactly that of the corresponding elliptic curve E having
a rational degree-ℓ isogeny. Assuming the curve is ordinary, which only disregards finitely
many j-invariants, the so-called volcano structure [13, 6] implies that, if the discriminant
∆(E) is a nonzero square modulo ℓ, then E has ℓ-maximal endomorphism ring and is con-
nected to other such curves by a cycle of ℓ-isogenies. Therefore the probability that we so
obtain a rational isogeny is ℓ−12ℓ under the heuristic assumption that ∆(E) behaves modulo
ℓ as a random integer.
The outermost loop is executed as many times as we require rational isogenies before
the kernel of one admits no nontrivial rational point. Recall that the modular curves X0(ℓ)
and X1(ℓ) essentially parametrize pairs (E,K) whereK is an order-ℓ subgroup of the elliptic
curve E, and pairs (E,P ) where P is an order-ℓ point of E, respectively. Similarly, one can
consider the modular curve associated with the congruence subgroup
Γ′1(ℓ) =
{[
a b
c d
]
≡
[
±1 ∗
0 ∗
]
(mod ℓ)
}
whose associated modular curve parametrizes pairs (E,±P ) consisting of an elliptic curve
and a point of order ℓ up to sign. The natural map X1(ℓ) → X
(
Γ′1(ℓ)
)
is actually an
isomorphism, and since X1(ℓ)→ X0(ℓ) is a cyclic Galois cover of degree
ℓ−1
2 , Chebotarev’s
density theorem shows that the image of X
(
Γ′1(ℓ)
)
(Fq) → X0(ℓ)(Fq) has density
2
ℓ−1 +
O(q−1/2). Thus, if (E,K) is uniformly distributed, the probability that all points P of K
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are defined over Fq2 (which is equivalent to saying that {±P} is defined over Fq) converges
to 2ℓ−1 . In particular, if E admits a rational subgroup K of order ℓ, the probability that one
such subgroup does not have nontrivial Fq2 -points is asymptotically 1−
2
ℓ−1 .
We conclude that the overall success probability of an iteration is at least ℓ−12ℓ
(
1− 2ℓ−1
)
=
ℓ−3
2ℓ up to the O(q
−1/2) error term, hence the expected number of iterations is less than about
2ℓ
ℓ−3 ≤ 5.
As an example, take q = 127 and ℓ = 13. For j = 60 we find that Φℓ(X, j) has two roots
in Fq. Thus, any elliptic curve E with j(E) = 60 is the domain of two rational degree-ℓ
isogenies; we take E : y2 = x3 + 25x + 58, of which the ℓ-division polynomial factors as
ψℓ(x) = f1(x)f2(x)f3(x)Q(x) with
f1(x) = x
3 + 88x2 + 60x+ 59,
f2(x) = x
3 + 91x2 + 14x+ 57,
f3(x) = x
6 + 36x5 + 17x4 + 73x3 + 88x2 + 11x+ 31,
and Q(x) is the product of six irreducible polynomials of degree twelve.
Since f3(x) has degree
ℓ−1
2 , it is the kernel polynomial of a degree-ℓ isogeny with no
rational kernel point. The x-coordinate map of that isogeny provides a first permutation
rational fraction:
x 7−→
(
x13 + 72x12 + 84x11 + 72x10 + 2x9 + 15x8 + 91x7
+94x6 + 4x5 + 66x4 + 17x3 + 49x2 + 48x+ 53
)/
f3(x)
2.
Now consider f1(x). We take ω = 2 as a generator of F
×
ℓ and deduce τ = 4. The
condition f1
(
φτ (x)
ψτ (x)2
)
= 0 mod f1(x) holds and therefore f1(x) is a factor of the kernel
polynomial of a rational degree-ℓ isogeny. We compute the other factor as Step 15–17 in
Algorithm 1 with m = 1 and find g(x) = f2(x). We then compute the isogeny with kernel
polynomial f1(x)f2(x) and obtain a second permutation rational fraction as its x-coordinate
map:
x 7−→
(
x13 + 67x12 + 13x11 + 61x10 + 83x9 + 50x8 + 49x7
+80x6 + 75x5 + 88x4 + 7x3 + 41x2 + 38x+ 7
)/(
f1(x)f2(x)
)2
.
Table 1 reports on running times for a simple PARI/GP [15] implementation of Algo-
rithm 2 on a single core of an Intel Xeon E3-1275 CPU.
Additionally, Table 2 gives the average density of computed kernel polynomials which
are not irreducible, that is, for which d < ℓ−12 . It shows that, for certain values of ℓ, although
the special case of d = ℓ−12 (that is, irreducible kernel polynomials) greatly simplifies our
algorithms, it significantly restricts the range of permutation rational fractions found. Note
that a density of zero is expected for ℓ = 23 and ℓ = 59 since in that case ℓ−12 is exactly
twice a prime number p, so all isogenies of degree d = 2, p have rational kernel points.
5. A family of candidate trapdoor permutations. Using the algorithm of the pre-
vious section, one can obtain a permutation rational function analogue of the RSA trapdoor
permutation. Indeed, consider an RSA modulus N = p · q. With the knowledge of the fac-
torization of N , one can efficiently generate permutation rational functions u = a/b ∈ Fp(x)
and v = c/d ∈ Fq(x) of the same prime degree ℓ, and use the Chinese Remainder Theorem
to deduce polynomials r, s ∈ Z[x] of degree at most ℓ with coefficients in (−N/2, N/2) such
that u = r/s mod p and v = r/s mod q.
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q = 2127 − 1 2255 − 19 2511 − 187 21023 − 361
ℓ = 13 0.13 0.24 0.57 2.53
ℓ = 23 0.68 1.28 2.98 9.81
ℓ = 37 3.25 5.99 15.48 43.14
ℓ = 59 21.38 35.02 89.05 227.20
Table 1
Average running time in seconds for Algorithm 2.
q = 2127 − 1 2255 − 19 2511 − 187 21023 − 361
ℓ = 13 0.55 0.40 0.55 0.50
ℓ = 23 — — — —
ℓ = 37 0.70 0.80 0.55 0.60
ℓ = 59 — — — —
Table 2
Density of computed kernel polynomials with d < ℓ−1
2
.
The function x 7→ r(x)/s(x) mod N is then a permutation of Z/NZ which is easy to
invert with the knowledge of the factorization of N (simply reduce modulo p and q and use
an algorithm like Berlekamp or Cantor–Zassenhaus to invert u and v). However, it seems
hard to invert it otherwise.
This construction is somewhat less efficient in terms of public key size and evaluation
efficiency than the RSA trapdoor permutation, but it seems to resist certain types of attacks
better: for example, there are no obvious malleability properties, which should thwart most
types of blinding attacks or related message attacks [2].
On the other hand, the security analysis is not entirely straightforward. Publishing r
and s could reveal some information on the factorization of N , since its factors belong to the
(presumably sparse!) set of primes p0 such that λr + µs has exactly one root modulo p0 for
all integers λ, µ, λ coprime to N . For example, if many values of (λ, µ) provided congruence
conditions on p0, one might be able to recover p and q using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
In practice, however, the polynomial λr+µs ∈ Z[x] will typically have Galois group Sℓ, and
so one presumably cannot hope to obtain a really effective description of the set of primes
at which it has a root.
6. Conclusion and open problems. We have seen that generating permutation ra-
tional functions, or exceptional covers of genus zero of the projective line, could be done
quite practically using elliptic curve isogenies, even over finite fields of cryptographic size.
The covers we obtain with our algorithms are (up to conjugation by linear fractional trans-
formations) exactly the exceptional involution covers defined by Fried in [7, §3.2]. Since
the classification of genus-zero exceptional covers of the projective line has been given by
Guralnick et al. [9], one could ask how to effectively generate permutation rational functions
from the remaining families.
Perhaps more importantly, one important open question related to this work is the
construction of higher-genus exceptional covers of the projective line. At least for covers
with dihedral monodromy, Fried mentions an interpretation in terms of moduli spaces of
higher-genus hyperelliptic curves which may lead to a similar algorithm using isogenies of
higher-dimensional abelian varieties.
Finally, an intriguing, if somewhat theoretical, question is the proper security analysis
of the trapdoor permutation described in §5.
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